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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, to analyze Schiller’s notion of aesthetic “freedom” throughout his aesthetic 
dissertations, a notion which is closely related to his famous theory about the “aesthetic State” as the ultimate form for the 
aesthetic education, a theory sketched out at the end of his 1794 Aesthetic Letters (or his Letters on the Aesthetical Education of 
Man). Second, to address Schiller’s critical reception of Enlightenment’s views on beauty, particularly Kant’s, who is Schiller’s 
main source of inspiration and criticism in aesthetics, emphasizing the relation of his own theory of beauty to aesthetic education. 
Third, to discuss the challenges that Schiller’s theory brings to the idea of “aesthetic education” in the aesthetic theories of the 
Enlightenment. Again, our main source for criticism will be Kant.      
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1. Introduction 
As many others throughout the XVIIIth century, the German poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller was the 
advocate of a theory of aesthetic education informed by an idea of Enlightenment: the idea of the progress of man as 
a progress in civilizing, in leading humanity out of its natural, brutish state towards a state of autonomy. In Schiller’s 
terms, enlightening man will mean the achievement of man’s state of freedom, where human freedom and the 
human being itself should be envisioned as a whole, both sensual as well as rational. By contrast, in Immanuel 
Kant’s terms, Enlightenment apparently meant the emergence out of man’s “self-imposed nonage,” as he describes 
it in What is Enlightenment?, emphasizing the achievement of man’s final state of autonomy (freedom) by reason 
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alone. Yet, the role of aesthetic education in relation to Enlightenment is generally not fully explicit. In certain 
cases, aesthetic education would appear both as a mean as well as an end: it could be a mean, insofar as it leads man 
on the path towards (further) enlightenment; it could also be seen as an end in itself, insofar as it encourages man to 
develop its own faculty of taste, to know and cultivate freely its own power of feeling, and, ultimately, to adhere 
freely to the tastes of others. All this boils down to a fundamental question regarding the aim and implicitly the 
particular nature of the Enlightenment itself: is there a single aim attached to the Enlightenment’s project and is this 
aim achievable in one way only? However, in both Kant and Schiller, aesthetic education is vital precisely because it 
supports the emergence of a common sense, a Gemeinsinn, in the case of which man is able to adhere, by way of 
beauty, to a sense of belonging together. This Gemeinsinn distinguishes a community of taste, of aesthetic 
appreciation. As we will see, this spirit of Enlightenment in aesthetic education has been informed by the aims of the 
Enlightenment’s project, outlined initially by the French Enlightenment thinkers. 
2. Enlightenment’s Aim(s) 
In his article Philosophe from the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers 
(Du Marsais, 2010), Du Marsais sees in the “philosopher” the key figure of the Enlightenment. Actually, in the 
figure of the “philosopher” we can easily find the model for the man of the “Enlightenment.” The “philosophic 
spirit” is described as “a spirit of observation and of precision, which relates all things to their true principles.” 
However, “it is not the philosophic spirit alone which the philosopher cultivates, he carries his attention and his 
concerns further.” It is reason that “compels him to know, to study, and to work to acquire sociable qualities,” so the 
philosopher’s life is a life dedicated to the enlightenment – both moral and intellectual – of fellow human beings. 
The philosopher is “an honorable man who wishes to please and to make himself useful.” He is not a social hermit 
or a social outcast. His correct use of reason is also his honorable use of reason: “Feelings of probity enter as much 
into the mechanical constitution of the philosopher as the enlightenment of the mind.” In contrast to “fanatics” and 
“superstitious” people, the philosopher’s attitude towards reason will thoroughly influence his life and conduct, as 
well as the life and conduct of others: “The more reason you find in a man, the more probity you will find in him  
(plus vous trouverez de raison dans un homme, plus vous trouverez en lui de probité). In contrast, where fanaticism 
and superstition reign, there reign the passions and anger. The temperament of the philosopher is to act according to 
the spirit of order or by reason; as he loves society deeply, it is more important to him than to the rest of men to 
make sure that all of his actions produce only effects that conform to the idea of the honorable man.” (Du Marsais, 
2010) 
Thus, the idea of the “honorable man” (honnête homme) is the cornerstone of Enlightenment’s view on man. 
However, the profile of the honnête homme also suggests that, to the authors of the Encyclopédie, Enlightenment 
had a threefold aim: moral, intellectual and social, the third one being, apparently, its ultimate goal. It is thus 
obvious, at least by the words of Du Marsais, that one’s enlightenment is not achievable by one’s own alone. One 
needs the others to live in an enlightened society, which is the apparent goal of the whole project. The honorable 
man’s life is therefore eventually dedicated to a social duty: the enlightenment of others. Thus, ultimately, neither 
moral nor intellectual enlightenment is fully achievable on one’s own: one cannot have enlightenment in a group of 
people where everyone is “on his own,” in the sense that everyone is ignorant to the other one’s feelings, thoughts 
and intentions: “Man is not a monster who must live only in the abyss of the sea or in the depths of a forest: the very 
necessities of life make commerce with others necessary to him; and in whatever state he may find himself, his 
needs and well-being draw him to live in society. Thus reason compels him to know, to study, and to work to 
acquire sociable qualities” (Du Marsais, 2010). 
The intellectual, whose epitome in the society is the Philosophe, is, undoubtedly, a philanthrōpos, a lover of 
people. He envisions his own enlightenment, as well as the enlightenment of others, as his ultimate goals. He hopes 
to live in a “civil society” which is, at the same time, civil as well as good. In many respects, this portrait of the 
philosopher is very close to the image of the “sage” (sophos) in Antiquity. Du Marsais actually makes reference to 
the Stoic sage, but he concludes that the philosopher of the Enlightenment is unlike the “insensitive” sage of the 
Stoics. He condemns Stoic individualism and Stoic apatheia, admitting that the modern intellectual is not a 
“phantom,” making “no claim to the chimerical honor of destroying the passions” (ne prétend pas au chimérique 
honneur de détruire les passions), but a person who is conscious of his passions, “making reasonable use of them,” 
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thus “benefitting from them, because that is possible, and because reason directs him to do so (parce que cela est 
possible, & que la raison le lui ordonne).” (Du Marsais, 2010). 
It seems that Du Marsais makes use of an image of man seen as a human being reasonable as well as sensuous. 
Because he is “insensitive,” the Stoic sage is “far removed from the perfection of our philosopher.” In other words, 
Du Marsais sees passions as an essential part of a man’s nature. Passions are, thus, essential on the path towards 
man’s “perfection.” This means that passions are educable, and that man in its entirety is an educable being. It also 
means that reason can educate the passions. Furthermore, our philosopher is driven by that common ground between 
humans, humanity, which is nothing but a deep feeling of empathy and benevolence towards others, a feeling on 
which all our other moral intentions are built: “For him, civil society is, as it were, a divinity on earth (la société 
civile est, pour ainsi dire, une divinité pour lui sur la terre); he flatters it, he honors it by his probity, by an exact 
attention to his duties, and by a sincere desire not to be a useless or embarrassing member of it. Feelings of probity 
enter as much into the mechanical constitution of the philosophe as the enlightenment of the mind. The more reason 
you find in a man, the more probity you will find in him. In contrast, where fanaticism and superstition reign, there 
reign the passions and anger. The temperament of the philosopher is to act according to the spirit of order or by 
reason; as he loves society deeply, it is more important to him than to the rest of men to make sure that all of his 
actions produce only effects that conform to the idea of the honorable man (…) he is filled with the ideas of the 
good and of civil society (…) his faculty of action is, as it were, like the string of a musical instrument tuned to a 
certain key; it would not be able to produce a contrary one. He is afraid to be off-key, to be out of harmony with 
himself (…). Now, the philosopher is disposed more than anyone else by his reflections to find more attraction and 
more pleasure in living with you, in attaining your confidence and your esteem, in acquitting himself of the duties of 
friendship and gratitude. (…) Ordinary philosophers who meditate too much, or rather who meditate badly, are 
ferocious towards everyone; they flee men, and men avoid them. But our philosopher, who knows how to divide his 
time between retreat and the commerce of men, is full of humanity (mais notre philosophe qui sait se partager entre 
la retraite & le commerce des hommes, est plein d'humanité). He is Terences’ Chremes, who feels that he is a man, 
and whose humanity alone makes him interested in the fortunes of his neighbor, good or bad (& que la seule 
humanité intéresse à la mauvaise ou à la bonne fortune de son voisin). Homo sum, humani a me nihil alienum puto 
(…)” (Du Marsais, 2010).  
3. Schiller’s Aesthetic Theory 
In the following, we will briefly delineate the basic tenets of Friedrich Schiller’s theory of beauty in relation to 
freedom, a theory that challenges some of Kant’s own theses from his Critique of Judgment. In our description of 
Schiller’s theory, we will be generally following Beiser’s analysis from (Beiser, 2005; see also: Barnouw, 1980; 
Guyer, 1990; Roehr, 2003; Gauthier, 1997; Deligiorgi, 2006; Maftei, 2013). Actually, Schiller’s ideas about beauty 
began to take shape long before the publishing of the Aesthetic Letters. However, the first important reaction to 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) appears in his 1793 Kalliasbriefe (see Schiller, 2003).  
In the Kalliasbriefe, which are a series of letters containing a sketching out of a theory of beauty, Schiller 
proposes a theory that will challenge several of Kant’s assumptions. In his analysis of the judgments of taste, Kant 
maintained that, even if the aesthetic judgments are universalizable, there are no objective principles to assess these 
judgments. In other words, aesthetic experience is based on a feeling of pleasure (Beiser, 2005). Schiller will 
criticize the thesis, by saying that if there is no objective principle for a judgment of beauty, then it is impossible to 
secure assent in a universal way for the judgment of taste. The judgment will contain only the feeling of the subject. 
We cannot, thus, agree upon our judgments only by describing the qualities of our feelings. There must be some 
qualities in the objects themselves that should assert our agreement. Schiller will reach the conclusion that, even if 
we cannot demonstrate the aesthetic judgments, this does not mean that there cannot be an objective principle of 
beauty (Beiser, 2005).  
In the same Kallias Letters, Schiller will ascribe a “principle of beauty” to practical and not theoretical reason. 
The principle of beauty must not presuppose the concept of an object; it is not cognitive (Beiser, 2005). Thus, the 
principle is also not constitutive, in Kant’s sense, it is only regulative. Being practical, it is possible, in this case, to 
treat objects as if they were only “appearances of freedom.” The beautiful is thus “analogous” to freedom, but it is 
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not really an “instantiation” of freedom (Beiser, 2005). As well as in Kant, “freedom,” understood both as “moral” 
freedom and “aesthetic” freedom, is “noumenal” to Schiller (at least in the Kallias Letters). This explains Schiller’s 
original definition of beauty from the Kallias as “freedom in appearance” (Beiser, 2005). This aspect comes forward 
in the Kallias, because, according to Beiser (2005: 58-62), Schiller insisted there that reason could be defined as 
either theoretical, or practical. Practical reason connects representations with the will for the sake of action. It also 
applies its forms to actions, which are necessary or free. Schiller will thus consider that the application of practical 
reason to free actions is called moral judgment, whereas the application of practical reason to natural events or 
necessary actions is defined as aesthetic judgment. Different from Kant, aesthetic judgment is, following Schiller, 
one form of practical reason, the form that applies its principles to events in the natural world (Beiser, 2005). The 
concept of beauty only appeals to our basic moral value, which is freedom. It seems that beauty is not actually moral 
freedom. Consequently, if beauty is “freedom” only “in the appearance,” under the form of a regulative principle, it 
is not a sensible manifestation of an idea, or a revelation of freedom, such as in Hegel (Beiser, 2005). Nevertheless, 
according to the same Beiser, Schiller will not be able to ultimately explain why “freedom in appearance” is actually 
an equivalent of beauty: “the realm of taste is the realm of freedom – the beautiful world of the senses is the happiest 
symbol, as the moral ought to be, and every object of natural beauty outside me carries a guarantee of happiness 
which calls to me: be free like me.” (Schiller, 2003: 166)  
Moreover, Schiller’s principle of beauty as “freedom in appearance” will get full recognition in his Aesthetic 
Letters (1794/95). Schiller’s thesis on beauty is stated anew, albeit in a different sense: “it is through beauty that we 
arrive at freedom” (Schiller, 1902a: 7). This paves the way to the major thesis of the Letters, the thesis about the 
“aesthetic education,” which shows that the harmony between reason and nature in the individual will only be 
restored when modern man acquires the experience of beauty (see Deligiorgi, 2005: 134). Frederick Beiser 
considers that Schiller also advances in his Letters a particular political (republican) idea, that “a person has the right 
to civil freedom only when they demonstrate their capacity for moral freedom“ (Beiser, 2005: 124). In other words, 
one cannot live in a moral state without each one acquiring and educating their own moral virtue. According to the 
same Beiser (2005: 154 ff.), Schiller will emphasize another important thesis, this time concerning the nature of 
freedom in the moral state: that freedom understood as (moral) autonomy is not enough; one must advance a new 
concept of freedom. Beiser contends that Schiller will address not one, but actually three notions of freedom 
throughout his 1794 Letters, of which two are obviously opposed: a freedom as autonomy (in a Kantian sense) and a 
freedom as “freedom of choice,” resulting from the “indeterminability” of what Schiller defines as the “aesthetic 
condition” (see Letters XIX, XX, XXI). The “aesthetic condition” is described by Schiller as a state of “active 
determinability,” a determinability in which actually one is not determined by anything, albeit in a positive way. 
Schiller will thus award a different “freedom” to the “aesthetic condition,” a freedom in which one might not be 
constraint to act morally at all (Letter XXII). The “aesthetic condition” basically generates a state of indeterminacy 
with respect to moral choice, but also unfolds that which sustains the moral choice in the individual, which is the 
very possibility of choice (Letter XXI).  
Thus, precisely because it is indeterminate, the aesthetic condition “restores” our freedom to us (Schiller, 1902a: 
75). Beauty does not produce by itself a moral result, but the freedom or the capacity to engender good actions: 
“beauty does not carry out a single intellectual or moral object” (Schiller, 1902a: 75). Schiller will also argue that 
the value of art resides in its freedom (Beiser, 2005: 155), this freedom being not the power to act according to 
moral laws (which is in itself a form of constraint), but the freedom of moral freedom, the freedom of freedom as 
capacity to choose in an absolute, infinite manner: “It is therefore not only a poetical license, but also 
philosophically correct, when beauty is named our second creator. Nor is this inconsistent with the fact that she only 
makes it possible for us to attain and realise humanity, leaving this to our free will. For in this she acts in common 
with our original creator, nature, which has imparted to us nothing further than this capacity for humanity, but leaves 
the use of it to our own determination of will.” (Schiller, 1902a: 75-76) 
Nevertheless, this is only the general picture about Schiller’s theory. As some authors contend (Barnouw, 1980; 
Gauthier, 1997; Tauber, 2006; Deligiorgi, 2006), there are psychological and empirical aspects in Schiller’s theory 
of beauty as freedom which have a tendency to undermine the basic autonomistic paradigm in Schiller’s approach to 
morality and aesthetics. There is, therefore, a real tension between the notions of “freedom” present throughout 
Schiller’s theories. These “freedoms” belong to different paradigms that do not match, basically. Following Roehr’s 
examination (Roehr, 2003), there are different conceptions of “freedom” as “autonomy” in Schiller, which belong to 
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the different stages of his philosophical development. First, we’ve got the difference between “moral” freedom and 
“aesthetic” freedom – “the appearance of freedom in a natural artificial object that only seems to determine itself 
through its own nature” – as it appears in the Kallias Letters (Roehr, 2003: 121). Then, we have to deal with a new 
idea of “autonomy,” which emerges, during the period after the Kallias Letters, out of Schiller’s contact with 
Reinhold’s notion of “neutral will,” a will this time situated beyond Kant’s practical reason, projecting a freedom 
which presents itself beyond the “law of nature” or the “law of reason” (2003: 127). A “will” that is in such a way 
“free” would be totally different from Kant’s. In one of his plays, The Robbers, Schiller portrayed, years before his 
encounter with Kant’s aesthetics, such a will out of the actions of Karl Moor. He described in a letter to von 
Dahlberg from 1781 his character’s acts as having “positive beauty” (Roehr, 2003: 126). In 1794, four years after 
the publication of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Schiller’s IV-th Aesthetic Letter will describe a will that is 
“perfectly free between inclination and duty, and no physical necessity ought to enter as a sharer in this magisterial 
personality” (Schiller, 1902a: 10; see also Roehr, 2003: 127). Moreover, Schiller’s theory of the “play drive” 
(Spieltrieb) from the XIV-th Letter, which reflects Reinhold’s own theory of drives, seems to play out precisely the 
Kantian dualism between nature and reason.  
Roehr will emphasize on two features that are consistently present in Schiller’s works. First, there is the focus on 
“reality/actuality,” which is opposed to the “mere possibility” in relation to freedom, such as the use of the concept 
of “force” when arguing about the “reality of acting freely in the world” (Roehr, 2003: 130), which is, obviously, a 
big step away from Kant’s denial of the possibility of demonstrating the reality of freedom. The second feature is 
Schiller’s constant concern with the “reconciling of the dualism of sensibility and intellect” (2003: 130). Apparently, 
Schiller’s theory of drives from the Aesthetic Letters advocates for a kind of freedom that is situated in the middle, 
as a “realm of undeterminedness (indeterminability),” between the realms of reason and nature, thus neutralizing the 
“absolute” determinedness of the two. This freedom is designated as the “aesthetic freedom” and it is represented by 
the Spieltrieb, the “play drive,” the third, whose action is placed between that of the “formal drive,” acting according 
to reason, and that of the “material drive,” acting according to the laws of nature (see XIV-th Letter). Another attempt 
at reconciling the Kantian dualism comes from the analysis of “grace” from On Grace and Dignity. In the apparent 
conflict between inclination and duty, which Schiller has inherited from Kant’s Groundwork, “grace” is precisely 
the moment in which duty will arise as if out of inclination, i.e. man’s natural, sensible faculties will not contradict, 
but will join forces with his moral nature. Feeling, therefore, will not be repressed for the sake of moral law. 
Through grace, the free will is “realized” in the natural world, emphasizing the presence of a “beautiful soul” 
(Roehr, 2003: 131). Roehr will conclude that the “aesthetic freedom” from the Kallias will disappear from Schiller’s 
later developments; however, another “aesthetic freedom” emerges in the Aesthetic Letters and other dissertations of 
this period: it is the “aesthetic freedom” which is particularly explained as emphasizing a non-dualism, i.e. a 
presence of “self-determination of persons” that marks the emergence of a beauty which can be also seen as a kind 
of moral beauty. Autonomy is thus not only moral “self-legislation,” but also free “self-determination” (2003: 133). 
This distinction between autonomy as self-legislation and autonomy as self-determination, inherited from Reinhold, 
will engender an ambiguity in Schiller’s texts, an ambiguity which is deep and resides in the role that the “aesthetic 
freedom” has in relation to “moral freedom:” is aesthetic freedom the incarnation of moral freedom itself? Is this 
“aesthetic state,” superior to practical reason, the pinnacle of moral enlightenment? Or is the aesthetic freedom, this 
indeterminability between the reason and the senses, just a propaedeutic for the true moral education achievable 
only in respect for the moral law?  
Another contentious issue refers to the clear understanding of Kant’s real contribution to Enlightenment’s 
aesthetics. It has often been suggested, as mentioned above, that Kant’s and Schiller’s views on the role of freedom 
and beauty in aesthetics are irreconcilable. As Guyer (1990) claims, the history of conflict between Kant’s and 
Schiller’s theoretical standpoints apparently falls back on a historical misreading of Kant’s analysis of the relation 
between duty and desire (Guyer, 1990: 139). In his study, Guyer will bring strong arguments to the idea that Kant 
does not actually support the idea that the motivation of duty “should act independently or even in opposition to our 
feelings” (139). Thus, the claims of pure practical reason can be harmonized with our feelings in teleological and 
aesthetic judgments, by the “sensible representation of morality” of beauty or by the cultivation of the moral 
feelings. Accordingly, Guyer identifies three situations in which aesthetic judgments may serve this purpose in 
Kant’s theory of aesthetic experience: when aesthetic judgments do contribute directly to the “cultivation” of our 
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moral feelings; when aesthetic objects serve as “sensible representations of moral ideas;” finally, when both 
aesthetic judgments and teleological judgments reflect the primacy of practical reason, the “unconditional 
superiority” of the use of reason (1990: 140). Thus, the situation where our moral freedom can be put at work 
completely cut off from our sensual nature is highly unlikely to occur in Kant: morality actually requires sensuous 
motivation, as some critics suggest (Gauthier, 1997: 522). Nevertheless, at the same time, reason remains the 
determining principle of the will in Kant’s ethics.         
Without understating the implicit tension between our sensuous motivation for morality and the “autocracy of 
practical reason” (1997: 528), as defined by Kant’s theory, Gauthier (1997) draws attention to what might be 
considered as the breaking point between Kant’s and Schiller’s theories. Although Schiller endorsed many times the 
Kantian position about the superiority of our moral reason over our senses, creating, as we shall see, interesting 
defences of Kant’s ethics, Schiller departs from Kant on a crucial issue: the theory of duty. Reading Kant’s analysis 
of duty from his Groundwork as a theory of the “divided will,” especially regarding cases when the moral law 
compels us to act against our sensuous inclination (1997: 518), Schiller will accuse the “barbaric tyranny of duty,” 
by claiming that suppressing our passions in the exercise of duty is not only a flaw in our moral education, but an 
impossibility of achieving one’s duty (Gauthier, 1997: 520). In rearticulating the relation between duty and 
inclination from Kant’s theory of duty in the Groundwork, Schiller will argue that inclination can be seen as the 
“sensuous vehicle of the moral law” itself (1997: 522), thus reclaiming nature as reason’s “sensuous deputy” (520). 
In criticising reason’s domination over nature, Schiller will try to answer differently to the question regarding the 
nature of the moral act of a partly sensuous human being. Ultimately, as Gauthier contends, Schiller’s theory of 
“grace” will try to counter the dominance of reason in moral motivation with a theory about the “spontaneity” of 
nature in the moral acts themselves. Through ”Grace,” he will try to deflect the conflict, by harmonizing the 
imperativeness and the independence of the moral law of practical reason with the “sympathetic” dispositions of the 
human body. Actually, Schiller will challenge Kant’s main assumption about the independence of the moral law, by 
claiming that the freedom of the moral law can be embodied and that this embodiment is a necessary condition for 
the moral law itself (Gauthier, 1997: 535).  Nevertheless, throughout his works, Schiller will keep supporting Kant’s 
ideas about the freedom and superiority of the moral law and about the legislative role of practical reason over the 
senses.         
4. Moral and/or Aesthetic Freedom? 
The main point of concern here is with the moral implications of aesthetic freedom, and generally with the 
relation between beauty and moral freedom, as described in the Aesthetic Letters (On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man, in a series of Letters, 1794) and in On Grace and Dignity (1793). Tauber (2006) will try to address the issue of 
aesthetic education by arguing not only that aesthetic education will serve a moral purpose in Schiller’s texts, but 
also that Schiller will try to develop a second thesis: that the aesthetic experience is itself the realization of moral 
and political freedom (Tauber, 2006: 23). Thus, according to Tauber, Schiller undermines the basic Kantian 
ontological difference between the regimes of goodness and beauty, since he realizes that moral praxis and aesthetic 
experience must be at the same ontological level, so that aesthetic education could have a real effect upon morality. 
This “reduction of the morally good to the beautiful” will try, in its turn, to answer to various questions, such as the 
“vicious circle” where “enlightenment conditions freedom and viceversa” or the “forced liberation” paradox: how 
can one have a “free society” out of a non-enlightened reality? (2006: 34). 
The issue whether aesthetic freedom is in itself the answer to the moral question is indeed a crucial one, but it 
cannot be easily dismissed. Schiller is particularly hesitating on this point. Even if the Aesthetic Letters propose a 
clear break from Kant’s moral autonomy, as it has been argued, the question whether Schiller was actually going 
further on this path is debatable. In On Grace and Dignity, he supplements “grace” with “dignity,” the submission to 
the moral law, in cases where morally beautiful actions cannot be achieved. Schiller’s XXIII-rd Aesthetic Letter 
describes the aesthetic state as a state of transition towards moral autonomy, as recorded by Roehr (1996: 132).   
There are several later works that deal with this subject. On the Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners (1796) argues 
that, concerning the relation between taste and morality, “taste may favor the morality of human conduct (…) but 
the influence of taste alone can never bring forth morality” (Schiller 1902a: 111). Nevertheless, taste can take the 
place of virtue in the “purified aesthetic soul,” but only when virtue is “absent” (1902a: 115). Also, “this victory of 
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taste over brutish affections is by no means a moral action, and the freedom which the will acquires by the 
intervention of taste is as yet in no way a moral liberty (…) Taste effectively governs the soul itself only by the 
attraction of pleasure; it is true of a nobler type, because its principle is reason, but still as long as the will is 
determined by pleasure there is not yet morality (…) the aesthetic  sense governs the will by the feeling and not by 
laws” (1902 a: 116). Taste will “only dispose a soul to virtue,” although “it could not injure true virtue” (1902a: 
119). It is thus that the aesthetically beautiful is only a transitory state towards moral virtue.  
The idea is also debated in the late essay On the Sublime (1801), albeit under a different line of thought: here 
Schiller states that only by “moral education” can man be “entirely free,” i.e. independent from “nature.” Kant’s 
prior moral argument regarding the sublime resurfaces (Schiller, 1902a: 128-132). When speaking about the 
different “freedoms” that beauty and the sublime foster in relation to “nature,” Schiller explains beauty as being 
“already an expression of [aesthetic] liberty,” whereas the feeling of the sublime, itself of a mixed nature, “proves  
(…) our moral independence” (1902a: 126-127). Yet only the moral liberty, which is guaranteed by the sublime – 
albeit only as “appearance” (138) –, is a mark of independence from our sensual nature, and makes us “citizens of a 
better world” (135) in the most authentic way: “The education that fits man for this is called moral education. The 
man fashioned by moral education, and he only, is entirely free (der moralisch gebildete Mensch, und nur dieser, ist 
ganz frei)” (1902a: 124).   
Nevertheless, aesthetic education keeps its well-defined place in the architectonic relation between spirit and 
nature, since, Schiller contends, “[man] is either superior to nature as a power, or he is in harmony with her 
(emphasis mine). None of the actions that she brings to bear upon him is violence, for before reaching him it has 
become an act of his own will, and dynamic nature could never touch him, because he spontaneously keeps away 
from all to which she can reach. But to attain to this state of mind, which morality designates as resignation to 
necessary things, and religion styles absolute submission to the counsels of Providence, to reach this by an effort of 
his free will and with reflection, a certain clearness is required in thought, and a certain energy in the will, superior 
to what man commonly possesses in active life. Happily for him, man finds here not only in his rational nature a 
moral aptitude that can be developed by the understanding, but also in his reasonable and sensible nature—that is, in 
his human nature—an aesthetic tendency which seems to have been placed there expressly: a faculty awakens of 
itself in the presence of certain sensuous objects, and which, after our feelings are purified, can be cultivated to such 
a point as to become a powerful ideal development. (…) I admit that the sense of the beautiful, when it is developed 
by culture, suffices of itself even to make us, in a certain sense, independent of nature as far as it is a force” 
(Schiller, 1902a: 124ff.). Thus, beauty is an “expression of liberty:” “No doubt the beautiful itself is already an 
expression of liberty. This liberty is not the kind that raises us above the power of nature, and that sets us free from 
all bodily influence, but it is only the liberty which we enjoy as men, without issuing from the limits of nature (zwar 
ist schon das Schöne ein Ausdruck der Freiheit, aber nicht derjenigen, welche uns über die Macht der Natur erhebt 
und von allem körperlichen Einfluss entbindet, sondern derjenigen, welche wir innerhalb der Natur als Menschen 
genießen). In the presence of beauty we feel ourselves free, because the sensuous instincts are in harmony with the 
laws of reason. In presence of the sublime we feel ourselves sublime, because the sensuous instincts have no 
influence over the jurisdiction of reason, because it is then the pure spirit that acts in us as if it were not absolutely 
subject to any other laws than its own (…) Man is in the hands of nature, but the will of man is in his own hands.” 
Throughout the discussion about the beautiful and the sublime, if seems that Schiller finally admits both aesthetic 
freedoms  –  i.e. on one side, the freedom that comes out as a state of harmony between the sensuous instincts and 
the laws of reason; on the other side, the freedom that surfaces out of the feeling of sublime, which “applies to the 
pure spirit” and reveals the “absolute moral power” beyond the senses (130) – as part of the aesthetic education of 
man: “beauty is useful, but does not go beyond man. The sublime applies to the pure spirit. The sublime  must be 
joined to the beautiful to complete the aesthetic education, and to enlarge man’s heart beyond the sensuous world. 
Without the beautiful there would be an eternal strife between our natural and rational destiny. (…) Without the 
sublime, beauty would make us forget our dignity. (…) We are only perfect citizens of nature when the sublime is 
wedded to the beautiful” (1902a: 137). At the end of his essay, Schiller does not forget to specify that both freedoms 
are aesthetic freedoms, since “all sublimity and beauty consists in the appearance” (138), and, implicitly, that both 
these freedoms are just more or less powerful expressions of moral independence itself, even if the sublime makes 
the argument for moral independence more strongly than the beautiful: “In the presence of the sublime, on the 
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contrary, reason and the sensuous are not in harmony, and it is precisely this contradiction between the two which 
makes the charm of the sublime  – its irresistible action on our minds. Here the physical man and the moral man 
separate in the most marked manner; for it is exactly in the presence of objects that make us feel at once how limited 
the former is that the other makes the experience of its force (…) The sublime opens to us a road to overstep the 
limits of the world of sense, in which the feeling of the beautiful world for ever imprison us” (1902a: 129-131). 
Schiller thus seems to revert to the Kantian position about aesthetic freedom and moral freedom that he had 
defended in the essays written before and after the Aesthetic Letters. It is also all the same remarkable that even in 
his later essays he was still searching for a solution to the Kantian conundrum, in trying to defend moral autonomy 
as being different from aesthetic freedom by resorting to another line of argument: to combine the “harmony model” 
and the “triumph of the will” model of “freedom” into one comprehensive theory of aesthetic freedom that 
embraced both the beautiful and the sublime without merging the aesthetic freedom with moral freedom (see, on this 
point, Roehr, 2003: 134).  
5. Freedom and the “Aesthetic State:” Towards a Theory of Aesthetic Enlightenment 
We have already observed that Schiller challenged Kant’s theory of morality in his Aesthetic Letters. As well as 
Kant, Schiller claims to be an autonomist in morals, although in the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller opposes Kant’s view 
on morality. His thesis will affirm that our sensibility and individuality cannot be sacrificed to morality (Beiser, 
2005). Our aesthetic education, as he suggests, will also have to take into account the fact that the person should be 
addressed as a whole, developing, by way of beauty, the harmony between our reasonable and our sensitive natures. 
Also, our aesthetic attitude will be an invitation to moral freedom, but not conditioned by moral freedom. Aesthetic 
education means only that our sensible powers would be developed fully, and that our sense of freedom, through 
“play,” will be left unharmed by the restrictions of morality. Only in the attainment of its fullest sense of freedom, 
which is the aesthetic freedom, will man be entirely free to observe and follow the prescriptions of morality. 
Throughout his entire work, Schiller will endorse a holistic view of man, a view which is quite foreign to Kant’s 
“Enlightenment” image of a man who is defined by reason alone: “Man is not soul and body, but the most inward 
and essential blending of the two” (Schiller, 1902b: 160). In Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters, freedom appears from an 
“aesthetic harmony,” as a state of equilibrium between the mind and the senses. Aesthetic harmony is a state of 
freedom not only from sensibility, but also from the constraints of morality. “One achieves freedom only through 
the path of beauty” (Schiller, 1902a: 7) means that one cannot acknowledge our full sense of freedom without 
aesthetic education. Up to this point, we have already observed that Schillers’ intertwining of aesthetic and moral 
freedom engenders a great deal of confusion throughout his writings, and that the two concepts of freedom actually 
belong to different paradigms.   
In his On the Sublime, Schiller contended that a certain liberty with respect to nature can be achieved not only by 
moral education, but also by an aesthetic development of our sense of beauty in the sphere of culture: “Happily for 
him, man finds here not only in his rational nature a moral aptitude that can be developed by the understanding, but 
also in his reasonable and sensible nature—that is, in his human nature—an aesthetic tendency which seems to have 
been placed there expressly: a faculty awakens of itself in the presence of certain sensuous objects, and which, after 
our feelings are purified, can be cultivated to such a point as to become a powerful ideal development. (…) I admit 
that the sense of the beautiful, when it is developed by culture (my emphasis), suffices of itself even to make us, in a 
certain sense (my emphasis), independent of nature as far as it is a force” (Schiller, 1902a: 124). Schiller will 
explain further that this harmony with nature is not a freedom from nature, but it is a freedom achieved inside nature 
itself: in beauty, the soul achieves a state of harmony between instinct and the laws of reason: “No doubt the 
beautiful itself is already an expression of liberty. This liberty is not the kind that raises us above the power of 
nature, and that sets us free from all bodily influence, but it is only the liberty which we enjoy as men, without 
issuing from the limits of nature (Zwar ist schon das Schöne ein Ausdruck der Freiheit, aber nicht derjenigen, 
welche uns über die Macht der Natur erhebt und von allem körperlichen Einfluss entbindet, sondern derjenigen, 
welche wir innerhalb der Natur als Menschen genießen). In the presence of beauty we feel ourselves free, because 
the sensuous instincts are in harmony with the laws of reason” (Schiller, 1902a: 126). 
The “aesthetic State,” a notion which appears only at the end of his Aesthetic Letters, embodies the ultimate form 
of aesthetic freedom. If, at the beginning of the Letters, Schiller spoke of a translation from a Naturstaat to a 
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Vernunftstaat (state of reason), in the sense that the development of a political community (state of nature) leads to 
the emergence of a moral state if the citizens are introduced correctly to the laws of civility, the last of the Letters 
describes yet another level, the translation from a moral state (or the ”kingdom of ends,” in Kant’s terms) to a higher 
level, which is the “aesthetic State.” It is this form of congregating that Schiller views as representing a deeper, more 
subtle, freedom: “In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred empire of laws, the aesthetic 
impulse of form creates by degrees a third and a joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where she 
emancipates man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all that is named constraint, whether physical or moral If 
in the dynamic state of rights [in dem dynamischen Staat der Rechte] men mutually move and come into collision as 
forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties [in dem ethischen Staat der Pflichten], man opposes to man the majesty 
of the laws, and chains down his will. In this realm of the beautiful or the aesthetic State, man ought to appear to 
man only as a form [so darf er ihm im Kreis des schönen Umgangs, in dem ästhetischen Staat, nur als Gestalt 
erscheinen], and an object of free play. To give freedom through freedom [Freiheit zu geben durch Freiheit] is the 
fundamental law of this realm (Letter XXVII-th)” (Schiller, 1902a: 108). 
If, in a political state, the individualities of the citizens must be respected, in the aesthetic State, the governing 
principle is “taste” itself. As the realm in which individuals are perceived as whole beings, they will join society 
freely, not out of duty, but purely out of inclination. The “aesthetic State” is thus the “political” example of the 
theory of inclination exposed in 1793 in his On Grace and Dignity. The aesthetic State is a state built not on 
physical need, nor on moral constraint. Its citizens will join only through their free dispositions. He asserts that the 
only way of creating a real “free” civility, neither a possible one in a “State of needs,” nor a necessary one in a 
“State of duties,” is in this “Aesthetic State:” “The aesthetic state alone can make it real, because it carries out the 
will of all through the nature of the individual. If necessity alone forces man to enter into society, and if this reason 
engraves on his soul social principles, it is beauty only that can give him a social character [Wenn schon das 
Bedürfnis den Menschen in die Gesellschaft nötigt und die Vernunft gesellige Grundsätze in ihm pflanzt, so kann die 
Schönheit allein ihm einen geselligen Charakter erteilen]; taste alone brings harmony into society, because it 
creates harmony in the individual (Letter XXVII)” (Schiller, 1902a: 108). 
In the common appreciation of tastes, an appreciation which appears as a form of communion through aesthetic 
pleasure, the “Aesthetic State” can create a Gemeinsinn, in a form of a communication (Mitteilung) that is appealing 
to everyone. Beauty is thus the only way in which we may be able to enjoy pleasures both as individuals, as well as 
members of our human race. Moreover, this mode of communication also bestows happiness on all of us: “Beauty 
alone can we enjoy both as individuals and as a race, that is, as representing a race (…) Absolute good can only 
render a man happy conditionally, for truth is only the reward of abnegation, and a pure heart alone has faith in a 
pure will. Beauty alone confers happiness on all, and under its influence every being forgets that he is limited (Letter 
XXVII)” (Schiller, 1902a: 109). 
There has been a great deal of debate (Tauber, 2006) whether this theory of the aesthetic State may have a real 
outcome or not, if it may be carried out socially or not. In other words, the question is whether aesthetic freedom is 
somehow a realization of man’s moral or even political freedom. If we return to Schiller, we may find out that what 
a beautiful appearance produces is a “delightful illusion of freedom,” in the sense that beauty cannot really achieve 
more than a community of taste whose form of communication would be aesthetic pleasure. The outcome seems 
obvious: beauty is bound to instantiate not only a higher freedom, but also a sense of pure “equality,” yet only 
among the “citizens” of a republic of Taste. However, this equality would not let itself be carried out politically: “In 
the aesthetic state the most slavish tool is a free citizen, having the same rights as the noblest; and the intellect which 
shapes the mass to its intent must consult it concerning its destination. Consequently in the realm of aesthetic 
appearance, the idea of equality is realised, which the political zealot would gladly see carried out socially (Letter 
XVII)” (Schiller, 1902a: 110). 
6. Conclusion  
Addressing the challenges for Schiller’s “aesthetic education” poses many questions regarding the role of 
aesthetic freedom in the realization of the moral (and political) aims of the Enlightenment. As well as some of his 
less known predecessors of the Enlightenment age, Schiller portrays the image of a man who is guided by his will to 
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educate himself, to transgress his natural, brutish, existence. However, in the end, Schiller is not a moralist, and that 
is, probably, his most important message for modern aesthetics: that aesthetics may offer the possibility of a “third 
way,” besides the intellectual and the moral, for the Enlightenment of man inside the realm of culture. Man can be 
thus “civilized” by beauty in a very peculiar way, in the sense that beauty may offer him a new way to achieve his 
expected civility – the aesthetic way.             
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